This p^)er r^»rts on the results of an auction sale of 83 aondcminium apartment units in New Jersey. At the auctiOTi every unit was hammered dcvm, but, unknown to the 2,348 registered bidders, 40% of the sales fell throuc^. Prices in the subsequent sale of oondaninium 'onits in face to face negotiatioTS resulted in identical units selling for 13% less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units haininered dcwn early in the auction. These results are inccaTsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of cannon value aucticxis and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a "winner's curse" v*iich generated considerable profit for the seller.
TESTING FOR FRICE ANCMALIES IN PEAL ESTATE ALJCnOJS
Orley Ashenfelter and David Genesove
In this ]paper we r^xjrt the results of a study of ccndaniniim prices.
Our study cxupares the prices paid in face to face bargaining with the prices fetched for identical condcodnium units sold at auctic^. Ihe results are striking. Our findings indicate that auction prices for identical units were 13% hi^ier than for units subsequently sold in face to face bargaining. Moreover, the price decline obtained by face to face bargainers was not independent of the order in v^ch the units were auctioned. Face to face buyers achieved hi^ier discounts relative to auction buyers vdio purchased early in the auction. Taken together these results indicate that the optimal strategy for a risk neutral ccndcndnium biQ^er is to make a purchase well cifter the auctic^has begun and, ideally, after the auction has been oorpleted! I.
ThB Price Decline Ancnaly and the Data
We collected the data for this study at an aucticxi of 83 ccndoninium units held near Princeton, New Jersey in^ril of 1990. CXir intention was to record the winning bids and the order in vAiich the units were sold with an eye to detezmining vAiether condctninivim aucticxis also shew evidence of uepartment of Eoononics, Prinoebcn IMiversity, Prinoetcn, NJ 08544 and Dqartment of Eoancmics, MIT, Cai±) the "price decline ancnaly" noted by Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee and Vincent (1991) the order of sale by using the relationship between these two variables under face to face bargaining. In practice the observed price decline may be due to both unobserved quality differences and ancracdous price declines, and belew we separate these two eooncmetrically.
When we began this project vie ejqjected that it vrould take several years before cill of the candaninium units sold at auction were resold in face to face bargaining. Much to our surprise, v*iile checking (at the tax assessor's office) the Scile prices for all the ccndoninium units "hainnered down" at the auction we discovered that 37% of the units had not, in fact, been sold at the "haMner price." Instead, these 31 units had all been sold at discounts fran the bid prices at viiicii they had been hanmered dcwn in the auction. In a series of subsequent interviews we learned that these units had typically been resold to another hayer after the original auction Scile "fell through." Althoui^we were able to interview only a fanall number of these subsequent buyers it e^jpears that th^typically constituted a group of registered, but unsuccessful bidders \it)o were subsequently contacted by the aviction ccrtpany to negotiate a sale in the week following the auction. In short, many of the identical units for vMch successful bids were established at the aviction were resold in face to face bargaining a few weeks after the auction.
(Ihe average sale dates were three weeks apart. ) This provides a remarkable opportunity to ccnpare the prices of identiccil objects sold at virtually the identical time by two different pricing mechanisms.
II.
The Enpiriccil Results The data frcm the auction sale in v^ch v^are primarily interested are plotted in Figure 1 in panels A-C. Every vmit was "hammered down," and the bid prices (indicated with the symbol "+") at the auctiai are displayed in the order in v*iich we recorded them. (In fact, the Cloister and Belvedere units were sold in two s^arate "pools" and the second pools began with units 25 and 17; this accounts for the two^ikes in panels A and C in the Figure. ) Uhits actually sold at the auction were sold at these bid prices. However, 31 of the units hammered dcMn were not, in fact, sold at the bid prices. Also displayed in Figure 1 are the prices Figure 1 , the price discount for subsequent resales was largest for those units sold earliest in the auction. In sum, these data provide strong evidence that the early auction bt^ers peiid a premium for the vmits they purchased that does not reflect their hi^ier quality, at least as judged by resale prices.
More formal tests of these hypotheses are contained in Table 2 .
Column (1) of the have been expected to pay prices similar to the prices the units v^suld fetch vdien they were resold. The hi^prices that aucti<^i bidders paid for these condominiums opens up the possibility that they were the subject of a "winner's curse" (vAiere buyers construct point estimates of the value of a property and feiil to shade their bids in anticipation of estimation error, as in Kagel and Levin (1986) .) More fundamentally, these data indicate that the market mechanism had a substantial effect on the prices at vdiioh these condominiums were sold and they raise some de^questions about the strategies and infonnation the bidders brought to this auction. After the fact, it is obvious that the optimal strategy for a bidder would have been to tie vp a ccxTdominium with a hi^bid, and then renege on its sale and renegotiate a loKi^er price. Ihe evidence from this aucticxi indicates that few, if arr/, btyers followed this strategy. We suspect that most buyers did not engage in this strategy because they were not aware of it. Ihis suggests that the auction seller has a considerable informational advantage over the buyers in a real estate auction, and that this advantage may have been put to good use in recent years to generate auctioneer profits at the expense of uninfonned buyers.
